Esta semana la única prensa en papel que he leído ha sido el WSJ, parte del imperio satánico de Murdoch, ya se sabe, le derecha extrema aliada del capitalismo explotador. A mí me gusta y encuentro en él artículos de opinión que no son fáciles de encontrar en ningún otro periódico. Será lo de la derecha extrema.
El jueves, en la sección de opinión, había un artículo de un procesor de la Booth School of Business de la Universidad de Chicago en el que argumentaba que la crisis de deuda europea no es más que una pantomima para rescatar a los bancos europeos de los posibles riesgos de impago por parte del Estado irlandés. Como se veía en una entrada anterior, la deuda pública irlandesa está mayoritariamente (más del 50%) en manos de bancos europeos, que tendrían un gran quebranto en el caso de que los irlandeses reestructuraran su deuda o salgan del euro.
This is not, in fact, an Irish bailout. It's a bailout of the European (including British) banks that lent a lot of money to the Irish government and Irish banks. If European governments want to bail out their banks, let them do so directly and openly—not via the subterfuge of country bailouts. Then they should face the music: How is it that two years after the great financial crisis, European banks make so-called systemically dangerous sovereign bets, earn nice yields, and then get bailed out again and again?
European bank regulators should announce that sovereign debt is not risk-free, and that their banks need capital against sovereign loans, or they need to buy insurance (credit default swaps) against sovereign exposure. Will taking this step hurt bank profits? Well, yes. Sorry. That game, at taxpayer expense, is over.
...
There are two lessons from this insight. First, given that the Europeans will not let governments default, they must insist on long-term financing of government debt. Debt and deficit limits will not be enough. Second, the way to handle a refinancing crisis is with a big forced swap of maturing short-term debt for long-term debt. This is what "default" or "restructuring" really means, and it is not the end of the world.
Governments like to roll over short-term debt for exactly the same reasons Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers did: It looks cheaper—at least until the crisis comes. But buying insurance is always expensive.
It's far less expensive than bailing out everyone, which is impossible. The party has to end somewhere. If not with Ireland, then with Spain. If not with Spain, then with Italy. If not Italy, then Germany. If not with Germany, then with printed euros and inflation.
Son las consecuencias de la perversa alianza entre políticos y banqueros. Aquéllos gastan más de lo que ingresan y se endeudan de forma salvaje, esa deuda la compran los banqueros, que esperan que los políticos acudan al rescate si alguno de sus activos se deprecia más de lo que les apetece. Y, al final, todo lo pagan unos esquilmados contribuyentes.
Desde mi punto de vista, tiene toda la razón. Una vez más, los contribuyentes al rescate de unos banqueros y unos políticos irresponsables
El jueves, en la sección de opinión, había un artículo de un procesor de la Booth School of Business de la Universidad de Chicago en el que argumentaba que la crisis de deuda europea no es más que una pantomima para rescatar a los bancos europeos de los posibles riesgos de impago por parte del Estado irlandés. Como se veía en una entrada anterior, la deuda pública irlandesa está mayoritariamente (más del 50%) en manos de bancos europeos, que tendrían un gran quebranto en el caso de que los irlandeses reestructuraran su deuda o salgan del euro.
This is not, in fact, an Irish bailout. It's a bailout of the European (including British) banks that lent a lot of money to the Irish government and Irish banks. If European governments want to bail out their banks, let them do so directly and openly—not via the subterfuge of country bailouts. Then they should face the music: How is it that two years after the great financial crisis, European banks make so-called systemically dangerous sovereign bets, earn nice yields, and then get bailed out again and again?
European bank regulators should announce that sovereign debt is not risk-free, and that their banks need capital against sovereign loans, or they need to buy insurance (credit default swaps) against sovereign exposure. Will taking this step hurt bank profits? Well, yes. Sorry. That game, at taxpayer expense, is over.
...
There are two lessons from this insight. First, given that the Europeans will not let governments default, they must insist on long-term financing of government debt. Debt and deficit limits will not be enough. Second, the way to handle a refinancing crisis is with a big forced swap of maturing short-term debt for long-term debt. This is what "default" or "restructuring" really means, and it is not the end of the world.
Governments like to roll over short-term debt for exactly the same reasons Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers did: It looks cheaper—at least until the crisis comes. But buying insurance is always expensive.
It's far less expensive than bailing out everyone, which is impossible. The party has to end somewhere. If not with Ireland, then with Spain. If not with Spain, then with Italy. If not Italy, then Germany. If not with Germany, then with printed euros and inflation.
Son las consecuencias de la perversa alianza entre políticos y banqueros. Aquéllos gastan más de lo que ingresan y se endeudan de forma salvaje, esa deuda la compran los banqueros, que esperan que los políticos acudan al rescate si alguno de sus activos se deprecia más de lo que les apetece. Y, al final, todo lo pagan unos esquilmados contribuyentes.
Desde mi punto de vista, tiene toda la razón. Una vez más, los contribuyentes al rescate de unos banqueros y unos políticos irresponsables
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